Would-cause semantics by Dowe, Phil
	
	






 !"#$%&"'$()*++,"$%+-.%--
)
) The University of Chicago Press)	!!Philosophy of Science Association
	)/0http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605796 .


-*1+-1*+-*+--2
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press and Philosophy of Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy of Science.
http://www.jstor.org
Philosophy of Science, 76 (December 2009) pp. 701–711. 0031-8248/2009/7605-0009$10.00
Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
701
Would-Cause Semantics
Phil Dowe†‡
This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would-
cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis’s semantics of coun-
terfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second,
there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal-modeling ap-
proaches do not have these problems.
1. Introduction. Possible causation is an important but overlooked topic
in the study of causation. Of particular significance are ‘would-cause coun-
terfactuals’ such as
1. ‘Had an event c of kind C occurred, c would have caused an event
e of kind E’, where actually no events of kinds C or E occur.
Would-cause counterfactuals are important in their own right for both
common sense and science. ‘If I had called Mum it would have caused
her happiness’ is an instance of 1, and such homely would-cause claims
can be generated indefinitely (see Dowe 2009, Section 2). Scientific ex-
amples are also ubiquitous: ‘had we applied radiation in time that would
have killed the tumor’. In this article, I raise two difficulties that David
Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals have with would-cause counterfac-
tuals. Before turning to these difficulties, I survey some theoretical uses
of would-cause counterfactuals.
2. Theoretical Uses of Would-Cause Counterfactuals. The first example of
the use of would-cause counterfactuals is Lewis’s theory of contrastive
causal explanation. According to Lewis (1986), we explain why e rather
than e* by supplying details of the actual causal history of e that differ-
entiate it from the counterfactual causal history of e*:
†To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy, University ofQueensland, Brisbane,
Queensland 4072, Australia; e-mail: p.dowe@uq.edu.au.
‡I would like to thank Stephen Barker and Jonathan Schaffer for comments on some
of this material.
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Why did I visit Melbourne in 1979, rather than Oxford or Uppsala
or Wellington? Because Monash invited me. That is part of the causal
history of my visiting Melbourne; and if I had gone to one of the
other places instead, presumably that would not have been part of
the causal history of my going there. It would have been wrong to
answer: Because I like going to places with good friends, good phi-
losophy, cool weather, and plenty of trains. That liking is also part
of the causal history of my visiting Melbourne, but it would equally
have been part of the causal history of my visiting any of the other
places, had I done so. (Lewis 1986, 229–230)
Call the details of the actual causal history of e c1, c2, c3, . . . . Call the
details of the counterfactual causal history of e* , , . . . . Thenc* c* c*1 2 3
Lewis’s account of causal explanation appeals to claims like
ci caused e, and had occurred, it would have caused e*.c*i
The latter is a would-cause counterfactual of the kind we are interested
in. According to Lewis, you can plug any theory of causation into his
theory of causal explanation, but of course we would be interested in
Lewis’s theory of causation. Actually, Lewis has several theories of cau-
sation; let us take his original theory. According to Lewis (1973), c causes
e if c and e are distinct events that occur and ‘had c not occurred, e would
not have occurred’ is true. This latter is true if and only if (iff ) e does
not occur in any of the closest worlds in which c does not occur and false
if it does. This evaluation of the counterfactual is to ‘suppose away’ a
positive event, let us say. But to evaluate the would-cause counterfactual,
we need, first, to, let us say, ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain
kind. And, second, we need embedded counterfactuals since we need to
analyze the cause in the would-cause counterfactual via the counterfactual
theory of causation. It is a reasonable demand, then, that Lewis’s se-
mantics can handle both these things.
The second example is my own account of ‘causation’ by absences
(Dowe 2000, 132–139), according to which absences cannot be causes or
effects, and ‘causation’ involving negatives is not genuine causation but
a stand-in that I call quasi causation, which essentially involves counter-
factuals about genuine causation. Quasi causation supervenes on patterns
of actual and possible genuine causation (see also Armstrong 2004, 66–
67). I will just summarize three well-known kinds (for more, see Dowe
2000, 132–139), expressed in terms of events. For a discussion of the
quasi-causal relata, see Dowe 2009.
a) Prevention by omission: not-a quasi caused not-b if neither a nor b
occurred, and
1. if a had occurred, a would have caused b.
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b) Prevention: a prevented b if a occurred and b did not, and there oc-
curred an x such that
(P1) there is a causal interaction between a and the process due to
x, and
(P2) if a had not occurred, x would have caused b.
c) Omission: not-a quasi caused b if b occurred and a did not, and there
occurred an x such that
(O1) x caused b, and
(O2) if a had occurred then a would have prevented b by interacting
with x where prevention is analyzed as above.
Example a1 is pretty much the would-cause counterfactual 1. Examples
b and c involve more complex kinds of possible causation. First, note
that a and c involve counterfactuals that suppose in a positive. And
second, to analyze ‘prevents’ in c, one appeals to b, which itself involves
a counterfactual clause P2. Thus, this account requires embedded coun-
terfactuals. Examples a and b do contain ‘cause’ within the counterfactual,
but this in itself does not require embedded counterfactuals unless one
wants to use a counterfactual theory of causation. My own account of
genuine causation (Dowe 2000) does not. In discussing this account of
absence causation (2001, 221), I said “it’s B.Y.O. semantics,” meaning
that any semantics of counterfactuals should work. That was a mistake.
In the light of Section 3 (below), I should have said “it is D.I.Y. semantics.”
The third example is Lewis’s account of absence causation as a variety
of causation (2004b, 284–285). Lewis gives the name ‘biff’ to the intrinsic
relation between distinct events that is typically associated with chance
raising (cf. Menzies’ 1996 account of causation). Then
i) Event c directly causes event e iff c stands to e in the relation that
occupies the biff role, or, for short, iff c biffs e.
ii) The absence of any event of kind C directly causes event e iff, had
there been an event c of kind C, c would or might have biffed some
event d incompatible with event e.
iii) Event c directly causes the absence of any event of kind E iff c biffs
some event d incompatible with any event of kind E.
iv) The absence of any event of kind C directly causes the absence of
any event of kind E iff, had there been an event c of kind C, c would
or might have biffed some event e of kind E. (Lewis 2004b, 284–
285)
This defines direct causation, and indirect causation is the ancestor of
direct causation.
Since biff is a variety of causation, iv is pretty much my would-cause
counterfactual 1. First, note that ii and iv involve counterfactuals that
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suppose in a positive. And second, ii–iv all involve counterfactuals about
biff. The ‘biff role’ is a chance-raising role. Chance raising involves coun-
terfactual chances: c biffs e only if the actual chance of e is greater than
it would be had c not occurred. Thus, to evaluate counterfactuals about
biff, we need embedded counterfactuals. Again, it is reasonable to demand
that Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals can handle both these things.
Finally, there are other theories that do not employ would-cause coun-
terfactuals but that do involve counterfactuals that suppose in positives.
These will be open to the first but not the second of the two difficulties
discussed in the next section. For example, Lewis (2004a) apparently gives
a different account of absence causation to the one discussed above. On
this account, ‘not-a caused not-b’ obtains on account of the true prop-
osition ‘had a occurred then b would have occurred’, although this does
not indicate a literal causal relation. This supposes in a positive. We would
have hoped that Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals can handle this.
According to the contrastivist theory of causation (Maslen 2004; Schaf-
fer 2005; Northcott 2008), c rather than C* causes e rather than E* iff
(i) c and e are actual distinct events, (ii) C* is a set of possible events
(situations) alternative to c and E* is a set of possible events (situations)
alternative to e, and (iii) for every event in C* there is an event inc* e*i i
E* such that if had happened then would have happened. This doesc* e*i i
not require embedded counterfactuals. But even for core examples of
causation, counterfactuals that suppose in positives must be evaluated.
Maslen, Shaffer, and Northcott each appeal to Lewis’s semantics for coun-
terfactuals, without strongly endorsing the approach. It seems necessary
for this theory, then, that Lewis’s semantics work for such counterfactuals.
3. Two Problems with Lewis’s Semantics. Although Lewis’s semantics
(1979) remain by far the most used and discussed semantics in the context
of counterfactual theories of causation, many difficulties with that account
have been identified (e.g., Barker 1999; Elga 2000). The current concern
is with difficulties that apply not to the evaluation of ‘had c not occurred,
e would not have occurred’ but with the extension of the approach to 1.
I raise two problems. The first concerns the general problem of supposing
in positives, and the second concerns embedded counterfactuals.
3.1. Supposing in Positives. When c does not actually occur, what is
(are) the closest c world(s)? (More precisely, when no event of kind C
occurs, what is [are] the closest world[s] in which some event c of kind C
occurs?) To adapt an example due to Hall (2002), suppose Billy shoots
down Enemy’s plane before Enemy can shoot down Suzy. Suzy goes on
to successfully bomb the target. Suppose also that Enemy’s being shot
down causes a grass fire. Grant the counterfactuals ‘had Billy not shot
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down Enemy, Enemy would have shot down Suzy’ and ‘had Enemy shot
down Suzy he would have prevented the bombing’. To evaluate ‘had
Enemy shot down Suzy . . . ’, we want the closest world in which Enemy
shot down Suzy. Lewis’s semantics say that, first, we must avoid large
miracles (big, widespread, and diverse miracles); second, we maximize
regions of perfect match with actuality; and, third, we minimize small,
local, simple miracles (1979). The idea is that the closest Enemy-shoots-
Suzy world is a world (or worlds) with perfect match until a time just
before a small transition miracle brings about Enemy’s shooting down of
Suzy, and then no further miracles occur.
First, there are worries about backtracking. When we make the claim
‘had Enemy shot down Suzy he would have prevented the bombing’,
plausibly we are supposing Enemy never was shot down by Billy. Ca-
nonical backtracking counterfactual reasoning is where we suppose away
an effect and make inferences about the absence of its (usually earlier)
cause (Lewis 1979, 33); Lewis’s semantics are not intended for backtrack-
ers. In our case we do not make inferences about what would have been
the cause of Enemy’s shooting down Suzy, but we do seem to incorporate
assumptions about the causes into the antecedent: ‘had Enemy shot down
Suzy (having not been shot down by Billy) he would have prevented the
bombing’. But even if this does not count as backtracking, it still com-
pletely undermines the point of Lewis’s semantics. Including this much
of the causal past in the antecedent will make false counterfactuals true,
such as ‘had Enemy shot down Suzy (having not been shot down by Billy)
he would have prevented the grass fire’. One point of maximizing regions
of perfect match is to rule out such spurious claims.
Second, supposing that we can avoid assuming this background ex-
plicitly in the antecedent, there are worries about whether the miracle it
would take to have Enemy shoot down Suzy could count as a small
miracle. The miracle cannot be one such that Enemy and his plane—or
an Enemy-like person flying a replica of Enemy’s plane—appear ex nihilo
while at the same time Enemy and his plane lie scattered across the coun-
tryside. This would violate all plausible theories of transworld and trans-
temporal identity. No, to get Enemy into place to shoot down Suzy, we
need (in a short transition time) to reassemble the scattered parts of Enemy
and his plane, which would involve numerous independent miracles. Ac-
cording to Lewis, a big miracle is a “big widespread diverse violation of
law,” which is composed of small miracles, but these are (1) many, (2) not
jointly localized, and (3) diverse, that is, involving violations of different
sorts of laws (Lewis 1979, 47). All three features are true of our divergent
miracle, hence it is a big miracle. Therefore, a closer world is one that
sacrifices some perfect match to avoid the large miracle: Billy’s gun jams
by a single small miracle, and Enemy is not shot down but instead goes
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on to shoot down Suzy. But again this opens the door to spurious claims.
If the closest world in which Enemy shoots down Suzy is a world in which
the only miracle is that Billy’s gun jams, then ‘had Enemy shot down
Suzy he would have prevented the grass fire’ comes out as true. So on
the counterfactual theory of causation, Enemy’s not shooting down Suzy
causes the grass fire; on the quasi-causation theory, it is a quasi cause.
Supposing in a positive event does not always involve big miracles.
Former prime minister Howard’s failure to say ‘sorry’ for the generation
of aboriginal children stolen from their parents could be supposed away
by inserting a mere pang of conscience. But many other cases look much
more like big miracles: in evaluating ‘had the doctor operated, the patient
would have been saved’ in supposing away the doctor’s failure to operate,
we need to get the doctor from his golfing holiday to the operating theater
and the patient from her shopping holiday in Paris and into the operating
theater. This requires distant diverse miracles on the golf course, in Paris,
and in the hospital. Again, avoiding big miracles is more important than
maximizing regions of perfect match, so the closest world in which the
doctor operates might be one in which he was never invited on the golfing
holiday in the first place. Again, this opens the door to spurious causal
claims.
Finally, another difference between supposing away and supposing in
positive events is that in the former case the spatiotemporal location of
the desired small miracle is pretty much fixed: a small time before the
occurrence of the positive. Not so with absences—there is much leeway
for where and when the positive occurs. In fact, given the requirement to
maximize regions of perfect match, the closest world in which the doctor
does operate is one in which he operates too late to save the patient—
thus we need to include a rider such that ‘had the doctor operated’ is
read as ‘had the doctor operated in due time’. But still, even granting this
(as perhaps we should), the closest worlds when supposing away an ab-
sence are last-minute worlds—for example, the doctor performs the op-
eration later rather than earlier. Perhaps that is just an unintended cu-
riosity.
It is not difficult to find scientific examples of this problem. ‘Had Mars
collided with Earth at the same time as comet x collided with Earth then
. . . .’ It would take a large miracle to transition from the actual course
of the solar system to the supposed collision with Mars, if this is to occur
in a relatively small transition time just before the actual collision with
comet x. Since avoiding big miracles is more important than maximizing
regions of perfect match, the closest world in which the collision with
Mars occurs is one with a small miracle that brings about a much earlier
variation to the orbit of Mars. But then other effects of the earlier varied
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trajectory of Mars will count as effects of the collision between Earth and
Mars.
3.2. Embedded Counterfactuals. Consider the analysis of cause in 1. On
the counterfactual theory of causation ‘had c occurred, c would have
caused e’ comes out as ‘had c occurred, then had c not occurred then b
would not have occurred’. We assume, actually, not-c, so from the closest
worlds in which c occurs, all the closest worlds in which ∼c holds need
to be ∼e worlds. There is no guarantee that this will covary with our
intuitions (see Barker 2009). The reason is that on Lewis’s semantics, to
suppose c requires a miracle. This is a violation of the laws of nature at
the actual world but not at those c worlds. The laws of nature at a world
for Lewis are the best system analysis of the distribution of particulars
at that world. The laws at the closest c worlds may then be different from
those of the actual world. To suppose, from any of those worlds that had
∼c, requires analysis in terms of the laws at the c world. Thus, whether
∼e obtains depends in general on the different laws and will in general
give different answers. Thus, Lewis’s semantics cannot handle embedded
counterfactuals. So the counterfactual theory of causation with Lewis’s
semantics cannot handle would-cause counterfactuals.
For example, suppose I do not actually drink arsenic, but I do drink
water, and we are interested in the counterfactual ‘had I drunk arsenic it
would have caused my death’, which we think is true. Suppose by Lewis’s
semantics that the closest arsenic-drinking world W1 is one in which a
small miracle turns the water I am about to drink into arsenic. Then at
that world, the laws allow for water to turn into arsenic. So, suppose
further that, in the actual world Wa, just before my drinking, the water
is in a state S (involving a very particular combination and concentration
of various minerals, say) that as it happens has never previously existed
in Wa. At W1, the small miracle is S to arsenic. Suppose that the laws of
W1 mandate the transition S to arsenic. From W1, suppose the closest
not-drinking-arsenic worlds are those with a perfect match with Wa and
W1 up to the time of the S-to-arsenic transition and in which by a small
miracle (according to theW1 laws) the S-to-arsenic transition fails to occur.
At one of those worlds it happens that the water in my stomach is in
state S and turns to arsenic and I die anyway. Closest-world analysis
requires that I do not die in any of the closest worlds, so it is not true
that ‘had I drunk arsenic it would have caused my death’.
The desiderata for a semantics capable of handling 1 are clear enough.
For a minimal correction to Lewis’s semantics, we need (a) to distinguish
in a noncircular way those big miracles that produce multiple partial
causes of an event we are supposing in from those big miracles that wipe
out the multiple traces of an event we are supposing away and (b) to
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appeal to the actual laws in evaluating embedded counterfactuals. The
latter approach has its advocates (e.g., Barker 1999). I know of no account
that meets the former desideratum.
4. Alternative Approaches. There are alternative counterfactual ap-
proaches to causation that explicitly eschew Lewis’s semantics and, in
particular, Lewis’s appeal to miracles. Most prominent is the causal-mod-
eling approach typified by Woodward (e.g., 2003). I will follow Craver’s
(2007) accessible account, which draws on Woodward (2003) and Wood-
ward and Hitchcock (2003), who in turn draw on the causal-modeling
tradition of Pearl (2000) and Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000). Ac-
cording to Craver, “Variable X is a cause of variable Y in conditions W,
if and only if it is possible in conditions W to change the value of Y with
an ideal intervention that changes the value of X” (2007, 94), where
An ideal intervention I on X with respect to Y is a change in the
value of X that changes Y, if at all, only via the change in X. More
specifically, this requirement implies that:
(I1) I does not change Y directly;
(I2) I does not change the value of some causal intermediate S be-
tween X and Y except by changing the value of X;
(I3) I is not correlated with some other variable M that is a cause
of Y; and
(I4) I acts as a “switch” that controls the value of X irrespective of
X’s other causes, U. (Craver 2007, 96)
This account is not concerned at all with ranking worlds according to
miracles and perfect match. Miracle semantics are replaced by the notion
of an ideal intervention. I do have worries about this account, but I do
not want to canvass those here. Rather, I want to show that the account
does avoid the two problems I have raised for Lewis’s semantics.
4.1. Supposing in Positives. The first problem concerns the closest
world when we suppose in a positive. The proponents of causal-modeling
claim that they can smoothly handle absence causation (e.g., Woodward
2003; Craver 2007, 104). I will show that they do avoid the problems with
supposing in positives that I have claimed besets Lewis’s semantics, pre-
cisely because they do not appeal to such a similarity measure on worlds.
Take the claim ‘Enemy’s not shooting down Suzy caused the bombing’
(causation by omission). Let
Xp 1 if Enemy shoots down Suzy, 0 if he does not;
Yp 1 if Suzy bombs target, 0 if she does not; and
Up 1 if Billy shoots Enemy, 0 if he does not.
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Given that Billy actually does shoot down Enemy, the relevant laws (with
an assumed direction) can be encoded as equations:
Up 1,
X  U,
Y  X.
We need an intervention I to bring about . This then replaces theXp 1
second equation (see, e.g., Hitchcock 2007), while holding fixed the actual
value of U. The equations become
Up 1,
Xp 1,
Y  X.
Thus , and we do indeed have a case of causation (by omission).Yp 0
The important point, though, is that we allow I if it fits I1–I4 above,
which requires holding fixed U. For causal modeling it does not matter
that intervention I might count as a large miracle on Lewis’s story. And
there is no ranking of large miracles versus perfect match that would
entail that we should, for example, vary U to vary X. Thus, causal mod-
eling does not lead to spurious causal claims in the way Lewis’s semantics
do.
4.2. Embedded Counterfactuals. The second problem concerns the em-
bedded counterfactuals we get when we analyze cause in 1, on a coun-
terfactual theory of causation. The version of causal modeling under con-
sideration is a counterfactual theory, but it does not run into the same
embedding problem discussed above. Take the would-cause counterfactual
‘had Enemy shot down Suzy he would have prevented the bombing’.
Assume for the sake of the argument that prevention is causation. Causal
modeling is not a method for dealing with counterfactuals in general, and
to my knowledge its proponents have not turned their attention to would-
cause counterfactuals. But it is not difficult to envisage how that might
go.
Recipe: Vary the independent variables from actuality to get the cases
in which the antecedent is true, in our case, where . Then ask, doesXp 1
cause ? If it does, in all cases in which , the would-Xp 1 Yp 0 Xp 1
710 PHIL DOWE
cause counterfactual is true. We get
Up 0,
X  U,
Y  X.
Then test by an ideal intervention on X, for example, Enemy’s gun jams,
so replace the second equation with :Xp 0
Up 0,
Xp 0,
Y  X.
Then , so does cause . Thus, we cannot end up withYp 1 Xp 1 Yp 0
different laws for evaluating the cause in the counterfactual scenario.
Unlike Lewis’s account, causal modeling, on its own terms, has no prob-
lem with embedded counterfactuals when evaluating would-cause coun-
terfactuals.
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